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DISCOVERY OF PRETRIAL PHYSICAL EXAMINATION
Steele v. True Temper Corporation
86 Ohio L. Abs. 276 (C.P. 1961)
In an action for personal injuries, defendant's motion for a pretrial
physical examination of plaintiff was granted. Plaintiff conceded it was
within the court's discretion to order such an examination, but opposed the
motion on the ground that the order should not be given unless conditioned
upon the right of plaintiff to receive a copy of the physician's report. The
court denied that plaintiff had such a right, and the motion was granted
without being conditioned in this respect.'
There is no statutory provision in Ohio governing the ordering of a
physical examination of the blaintiff in personal injury actions, but the
cases are clearly in support of the proposition that the court has this power.2
There is, however, some conflict regarding plaintiff's right to discovery of the
physician's report, with the majority of Ohio courts holding that such dis-
covery will not be allowed.3 In Carpenter v. Dawson the court stated that:
[T] he medical report, including findings and conclusions of the ex-
amining physician, is made at the instance of counsel for the de-
fendant in preparation of his defense and for the defendant's
benefit, and as such, the report itself becomes confidential as far as
other parties are concerned.4
A contrary result was reached in Francisco v. Hoffman5 where the court
granted a pretrial medical examination and ordered that if counsel for the
plaintiff or plaintiff's personal physician were not present at such examina-
tion, plaintiff's counsel could examine the report. However, it was to be
used as evidence only in cross examination of the physician in the event
he was introduced as a witness at the trial.
In comparison, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provide
for physical examinations in Rule 35(a) .6 Rule 35(b)(1) provides that
upon request, the examining party shall deliver a copy of the physician's
report including findings and conclusions to the examined party. After
this delivery, the examining party is entitled to receive, upon request, copies
1 Steele v. True Temper Corp., 86 Ohio L. Abs. 276 (C.P. 1961).
2 S.S. Kresge Co. v. Trester, 123 Ohio St. 383, 175 N.E. 611 (1931); Miami &
M. Turnp. Co. v. Baily, 37 Ohio St. 104 (1881); Hoge v. Soissons, 48 Ohio App. 221,
192 N.E. 860 (1933).
3 In Re Bates, 167 Ohio St. 46, 146 N.E.2d 306 (1957); Theetge v. Cincinnati
St. Ry., 60 Ohio Op. 372 (C.P. 1955); Carpenter v. Dawson, 60 Ohio Op. 370 (C.P.
1957). Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 384 (1960).
4 Carpenter v. Dawson, ibid.
5 Francisco v. Hoffman, 60 Ohio Op. 371 (C.P. 1955), 131 N.E.2d 692, citing
17 Am. Jur. "Discovery and Inspection" § 56.
6 Fed. R. Civ. P.
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of reports made by the examined party's physician.7  Various state courts
have adopted rules similar to Rule 35(b) (1).8
The common pleas court in the True Temper case supports the Ohio
view of non-discovery of physical examinations on two grounds. The first
is based on tradition. Litigation has traditionally been an adversary process
with the burden of proof resting on the plaintiff. Therefore, the defendant
should not be required to divulge the aspects of his investigation and his
evidence as long as a corresponding obligation does not fall on the plaintiff.9
An answer to the "tradition" argument is provided by Edwin F. Woodle'0
who, in an article on Ohio discovery practice, recommends that courts should
7 The provision for exchange of reports by the examined party is to be reason-
ably construed, and does not place upon him the burden of securing copies of
hospital records or physicians' office records. Lindsay v. Prince, 8 F.R.D. 233 (NM.
Ohio 1948). When plaintiff volunteers to undergo a physical examination, the absence
of an order of court under Rule 35(a) does not defeat his right under 35(b) to
obtain a copy of the report. Keil v. Himes, 13 F.R.D. 451 (ED. Pa. 1952).
8 One of these states is New York. Although the New York courts have not
been in absolute harmony, the clear weight of opinion now favors allowing plaintiff
discovery of reports made by defendant's physician. The trend is pointed out in
Muratori v. 1231 Pugsley Ave. Realty Co. 15 Misc. 2d 276, 157 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1956),
where the court ordered that plaintiff be given a copy of the defendant's physician's
report. The court said that the old rule, which encouraged a plethora of medical
testimony, was hostile to the modern tendency to reduce to a minimum controversy
on the medical aspects of personal injury actions. The Supreme Court of Florida is
in accord with Muratori. In the case of Fred Howland, Inc. v. Morris, 143 Fla. 189,
196 So. 472 (1940), the court held that it is not unfair to require defendant to
relinquish a copy of such report to plaintiff when plaintiff is the subject of the
report, and by submitting to the examination may weaken his own case. (Additional
fair play aspects of the exchange of medical reports are discussed below.)
9 This argument, while of decreasing value in modem practice, is in line
with the attitude toward discovery which has predominated in Ohio since Chapman
v. Lee, 45 Ohio St. 356, 13 N.E. 736 (1887). Discovery in Ohio is provided under
Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2308.43, 2317.07, 2317.32, 2317.33, 2317.48, and 2319.05. The scope of
discovery extends to evidence "pertinent to the issues," Ex Parte Schoepf, 74 Ohio
St. 1, 77 N.E. 276 (1906). Under Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.48, an action for discovery
will lie for one unable without such discovery to file a petition or an answer in a
separate cause of action. This statute provides discovery of "things" in the possession
of an opponent, Lawson v. Hudepohl, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 332, 101 N.E.2d 254 (C.P.
1951). Production of books and writings may be obtained under Ohio Rev. Code
§ 2317.32. In comparison, Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure extends
the scope of discovery to "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter." The relatively limited availability of discovery in Ohio seems to
stem "not so much from the absence of procedural rights as from the manner in which
the courts of Ohio have interpreted, restricted, and restrained the application of those
rights." Woodle, "Discovery Practice in Ohio-Pathway to Progress," 8 W. Res.
L. Rev. 117 (1957). For a recent Ohio case using a liberal scope of discovery similar
to that in the federal courts see Dieckbrader v. N.Y. Cent. R., 51 Ohio Op. 239, 113
N.E.2d 268 (CP. 1953). Encouraging dicta may be found in the most recent Ohio




not rely on a doctrine that prevents a litigant from "prying into" the case
of his opponent." It may be vital to a plaintiff's case not only to have
evidence to support his petition, "but to be prepared to meet the claims and
defenses of his opponent. To be properly prepared, he should be informed
concerning those claims and defenses in detail in advance of the trial." 2
Applied to discovery of physical examinations, Mr. Woodle's recommenda-
tion would not only benefit plaintiff's preparation, but also lead to settlement
before trial in many cases where the main question was the amount of
damages and not liability.
The second ground used by the court in True Temper is the fear of
permitting an attorney's trial preparation to be available to his opponent
through the use of discovery.' 3 This is called invasion of work product.'
4
11 Ibid. at 141.
12 Ibid.
13 Steele v. True Temper Corp., supra note 1, at 285.
14 The term "work product" was first used in the case of Hickman v. Taylor,
329 U.S. 495 (1947). See "Developments in the Law-Discovery," 74 Harv. L. Rev.
1027 (1960). According to the work product doctrine, the impressions, observations,
and opinions which an attorney has recorded and transferred to his files shall be
free from encroachments of opposing counsel except in unusual circumstances. This
protection includes knowledge gained by an attorney through the efforts of an
expert whom he has employed to investigate matters of a technical or scientific nature.
Colden v. R. J. Schofield Motors, 14 F.R.D. 521 (N.D. Ohio 1952). The term "work
product" has been variously characterized as a "privilege," "exemption," or "immunity."
It matters little what terminology is emphasized so long as it is understood that the
phrase encompasses something apart from confidential communications between an
attorney and his client. The two concepts are distinguished by their underlying policies.
The attorney-client privilege is intended to encourage full disclosure between an
attorney and his client by guaranteeing the inviolability of their confidential com-
munications. The "work product of an attorney" is protected in order to preserve
our adversary system of litigation by assuring an attorney that his private files shall,
except in unusual circumstances, remain free from encroachments of opposing counsel.
Work product is discoverable upon a strong showing of good cause. The written state-
ment of a witness is not the work product of an attorney since it records the mental
impressions and observations of the witness himself and not the attorney. On the
other hand, counsel's recordation of the oral statement of a witness is normally a
part of his work product, for it will include his analysis and impression of what
the witness has told him. Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 15 F.R.D.
55 (D.C. Ohio 1953). This distinction is not always made in Ohio cases which
give wide extension to the attorney-client privilege. In re Tichy, 161 Ohio St. 104,
118 N.E.2d 128 (1954); In re Shoup, 154 Ohio St. 221, 94 N.E.2d 625 (1950); In re
Keough, 151 Ohio St. 307, 85 N.E.2d 550 (1959); In re Hyde, 149 Ohio St. 407, 79
N.E.2d 24 (194); In re Kleman, 132 Ohio St. 187, 5 N.E.2d 492 (1936); Ex parte
Schoepf, 74 Ohio St. 1, 77 N.E. 276 (1906). See Humphries v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
14 F.R.D. 177 (dictum) (D.C. Ohio 1953) that certain accident reports not privileged
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as interpreted by the federal courts
to mean privileged as in the law of evidence, would be privileged under the extension
of the attorney-client privilege in § 11494 of the Ohio General Code (Ohio Rev. Code
§ 2317.02) as interpreted by the Ohio courts, citing the Hyde and Shoup cases. The
court then held that the doctrine of Erie R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), was not
1962]j
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Apparently the basis of this doctrine is to (1) protect the attorney's trial
strategy, and (2) encourage diligence in the profession. By the latter it is
meant that if the attorney knows his trial preparation is discoverable,
he may become discouraged from putting forth his best efforts, especially
in procuring expert advice. Protection of trial strategy is not reconcilable
with the purpose of discovery which is the elimination of surprise at trial.15
This would seem, therefore, to be a matter best put to the discretion of
the trial judge, i.e., to allow the court to determine whether the protection of
trial strategy is sufficient reason to deny discovery. The "diligence rationale"
of the work product doctrine has doubtful application in the case of
procuring a physical examination of a plaintiff in a personal injury case.
It seems unlikely that any defense attorney would be so discouraged by the
discoverability of such information that he would go into court unarmed
with his own medical testimony.
It may be that Ohio courts in refusing discovery of the physician's
report are concerned with certain "fair play" aspects. Thus, a plaintiff may
have discovered the defendant's reports, but may withhold his own physi-
cian's reports from the defendant, claiming the physician-patient privilege. 16
This difficulty may be overcome by conditioning plaintiff's right to discovery
on his waiving all privilege with respect to his own relevant medical reports.17
The purposes behind discovery itself, to whittle away the sporting
theory of litigation, to simplify and shorten personal injury cases,'3 and to
eliminate extended parades of expert medical witnesses are better served by
rules similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which allow discovery
of the defendant's physician's report. 19 Furthermore, the confusion in juris-
dictions which have no legislation on this matter, when compared to the
lack of controversy in the federal courts under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, seems to indicate that this is a problem better handled by the
legislature than left to the courts.
applicable and therefore the court need not apply Ohio law. See also Eisaman v.
Weimer, 70 Ohio L. Abs. 199, 126 N.E.2d 92 (C.P. 1954); Woodle, supra note 9,
at 462-472.
15 See Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure, 641 (1961).
16 Ohio Rev. Code § 2317.02.
17 By requesting and obtaining a report of the examination so ordered or by
taking deposition of the examiner, the examined party waives any privilege he may
have in that action or any other involving the same controversy, regarding the
testimony of every other person who has examined or who may thereafter examine
him in respect of the same mental or physical condition. Fed R. Civ. P. 35(b)(2).
See Lewis v. United Airlines Transp. Corp., 32 F. Supp. 21 (D.C. Pa. 1940). See
note 7, supra for certain practical aspects of this exchange.
18 Jacobs, "Physical and Mental Examinations," U. Ill. L.F. 761 (1959). The
author comments that if the facts are merely being discovered and not manufactured,
the physician should be a court witness, "and there should be no fanciful theory
of 'work product' to hide the scientific facts . . . . Such a concept is the antithesis
of the modern theory of discovery and merely encourages some medical experts to
take undue liberties with the facts."
19 Supra note 8; Fed. R. Civ. P. 35(b)(1).
